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Summary Paragraph: 20 
Halting global forest loss while reducing poverty is central to sustainable development 
agendas1,2. Since the 1980’s, decentralized forest management has been promoted as a 
way to enhance sustainable forest use and reduce rural poverty3, and rural communities 
manage increasing amounts of the world’s forests4. Yet rigorous evidence using large-
N data on whether community-based forest management (CFM) can jointly reduce both 25 
deforestation and poverty remains scarce. Studies to date have largely relied on cross-
sectional analyses of single outcomes, or used qualitative poverty assessments that are 
difficult to compare across space or time5. We estimate impacts of CFM using a large 
longitudinal dataset that integrates national-census-based poverty measures with high-
resolution forest cover change data, and near-complete information on Nepal’s > 30 
18,000 community forests. We compare changes in forest cover and poverty from 2000-
2012 for sub-districts with presence or absence of CFM arrangements, but that are 
otherwise similar in terms of socioeconomic and biophysical baseline measures. Our 
results indicate that community-based forest management has, on average, contributed 
to significant net reductions in both poverty and deforestation across Nepal, and that 35 
CFM increases the likelihood of win-win outcomes. We also find that the estimated 
reduced deforestation impacts of community forests are lower where baseline poverty 
levels are high, and greater where community forests are larger and have existed longer.  
These results indicate that greater benefits may result from longer-term investments and 
larger areas committed to community forest management, but that community forests 40 
established in poorer areas may require additional support to minimize trade-offs 
between socioeconomic and environmental outcomes.  
Main text: 
Forests are critical to sustainable development. They regulate climate, sequester carbon, 
harbour biodiversity, and contribute to national incomes and local livelihoods6. Over 45 
the past four decades, governments and international organizations have promoted 
decentralized community-based forest management (CFM) to achieve sustainable 
forest use and reduce rural poverty3. In decentralized decision-making arrangements, 
the primary responsibility for day-to-day management rests with forest-user 
communities. Ideally, this allows communities to make better use of their time and 50 
place-specific knowledge to promote more efficient, equitable, and sustainable multi-
functional landscapes7. 
Local communities now legally manage approximately 13% of the world’s 
forests4. Debates about whether CFM truly reduces forest loss and alleviates poverty, 
nonetheless, continue5,8. Case studies from Latin America, Africa, and South Asia show 55 
that some CFM initiatives have improved forest and livelihood outcomes9,10, but that 
others have not achieved intended objectives3,11. The vast majority of existing studies 
have focused on limited sets of cases, and have used qualitative assessments of poverty 
and livelihood outcomes that are difficult to compare across space and over time5. 
These studies have helped identify how land tenure, local autonomy, and collective 60 
action may contribute to effective and equitable CFM, but have not tested whether CFM 
programs lead to net environmental and socio-economic improvements at national 
scales5. Some studies use more rigorous evaluations of CFM but they generally focus 
on single outcomes, studying the relationship between CFM on either forests12-14 or 
poverty15,16, often at single points in time17,18. 65 
We analyse forest cover change and poverty alleviation outcomes of CFM for 
the case of Nepal using a high-spatial resolution, national-level, longitudinal dataset 
(see Methods). Our study makes three key advances. First, we analyse the average 
effects of CFM at a national scale using a near-complete census of Nepal’s 18,321 
registered community forests. Second, we combine these data with sub-district level, 70 
national census-based multi-dimensional poverty measures (2001-2011) and high-
resolution forest cover change data (2000-2012). Finally, given the multiple drivers of 
deforestation19 and poverty alleviation20, our approach aims to separate CFM impacts 
from other potential socioeconomic and biophysical factors affecting the establishment 
of CFM that could also impact forest and poverty outcomes (see Methods). Specifically, 75 
we combine statistical matching and multiple regression analyses to control for 
potential geographic, economic and political drivers of outcomes at the sub-district 
level. These include: slope, elevation, precipitation, population density, agricultural 
effort, international migration, travel time to market and population centres, distance to 
district headquarters, presence of protected areas, and baseline measures of poverty and 80 
forest cover, as well as administrative-level fixed effects that control for factors 
common to each district such as government investments in education or health. These 
methods seek to ensure that treated and control groups are similar to each other21, and 
follow established quasi-experimental approaches to evaluation of conservation 
interventions22-24. Our identification of impacts relies on plausibly exogenous 85 
conditional variation in CFMs arising from the history of multiple NGOs, government 
agencies, and international donors, operating in non-systematic ways across time and 
space (see Methods). We test the robustness of our results with respect to potential 
unmeasured confounding variables such as other government programs that may be 
correlated with CFM (see Sensitivity Analyses in Methods and Supplementary 90 
Information). Our analysis advances the literature by (i) assessing rigorously the effect 
of community forests on reductions in both deforestation and poverty alleviation, (ii) 
evaluating poorly understood trade-offs between the two outcomes, and (iii) 
investigating how poverty moderates the success of CFM - a critical link that has 
received only limited attention. 95 
Several factors justify our Nepal focus. The country has a long-standing CFM 
programme first initiated in the 1970’s and subsequently supported by key legislative 
reforms and substantial international aid from the late 1980’s to the present25,26. 
Estimates suggest that a quarter of the country’s forests are directly managed by more 
than a third of the country’s predominantly rural population26. Nepal’s forests are 100 
distributed across different eco-regions (subalpine high mountains = 32%, temperate 
and subtropical middle hills = 38%, tropical lowlands = 30%)27. The country’s CFM 
program is large but not exceptionally so. Several countries (e.g., Mexico, Madagascar, 
and Tanzania) have similar CFM programs12,15,28, and others are developing them (e.g., 
Indonesia). Although context may be somewhat different, lessons from Nepal may 105 
provide useful insights for other countries with similar types of forest decentralisation 
policies. Importantly, relevant government agencies made the necessary data available 
for integration across sources and spatial scales.  
Various complex direct and indirect mechanisms may contribute to net 
reductions in deforestation and poverty as a result of CFM in Nepal and other countries. 110 
Under CFM, community forest user groups can establish and enforce rules to promote 
more sustainable use and flows of forest resources over time. These CFM land use 
restrictions can limit agricultural production, logging, and forest product extraction, 
leading to less deforestation, reduced forest degradation, and faster reforestation rates. 
Substantial household benefits can come from the ongoing, but more sustainable, use 115 
of timber, construction materials, firewood, food and medicinal plants, and also fodder 
for livestock and composting materials for agriculture29,30. Households may also gain 
income directly from sales of forest products through forest-based enterprises. Such 
revenue streams can account for as much as half of households’ income29,31. In some 
instances, communities also use internal levies from forest products to fund 120 
community-level infrastructure improvements, promoting long-term development and 
community benefits. However, both levies and use restrictions may disproportionally 
burden those unable to afford them32. In extreme cases, CFM benefits could be captured 
by only a few households, failing to reduce average poverty levels.  
We first assessed the impact of CFM on deforestation and poverty using 125 
longitudinal data for 3832 of Nepal’s 3973 Village Development Committees (VDCs, 
our unit of analysis - Fig. 1a), which are sub-district administrative units equivalent to 
municipalities in other countries. We compare VDCs with any CFM (mean area under 
CFM = 13%) with VDCs that are similar in biophysical and socioeconomic 
characteristics but without CFM (see Methods and Supplementary Information for 130 
robustness tests using treatment allocation thresholds). More than 80% of community 
forests were established between 1993 and 200225. We thus focus on CFM 
arrangements established before 2000 for our main analysis (but see SI for additional 
analyses of CFM established after 2000, and for robustness checks that support our 
main findings using additional forest cover change data and comparisons of poverty 135 
metrics). Our approach uses variation in establishment of CFMs, after controlling for 
confounders, driven by multiple international donors and NGO’s working with the 
government during this period (see Methods; see Supplementary Fig. 8).  
After controlling for confounding variables, we find statistically significant net 
positive relationships between CFM and forest cover change (P = 0.004, Fig. 1b, 140 
Supplementary Table 1) and CFM and poverty alleviation (P < 0.001, Fig. 1c, 
Supplementary Table 1). At the level of individual VDCs, our results equate to an 
average of 1.6 hectares deforestation that is avoided (S.E. = 0.83), and 20 households 
lifted out of poverty (S.E. = 0.62) between 2000 and 2012. This compares to mean 
deforestation levels of 5 hectares (S.E. = 1.0) and poverty levels of 316 households 145 
(S.E. = 6.3) in matched control VDCs, meaning that our results translate to a 32.6% 
relative reduction in deforestation and a 6.4% relative reduction in poverty that is 
attributable to CFM. Our results are robust to the use of different remote sensing data, 
or separate analyses of forest gain and loss (Supplementary Information). 
 We also assessed whether the area under CFM and the duration of CFM 150 
arrangements affected deforestation and poverty, by focusing only on VDCs with CFM 
arrangements (n = 2138). We find that larger CFM areas (> 8.3% of VDC area) were 
significantly linked to reductions in poverty among CFM VDCs (P < 0.001, Fig. 1c, 
Supplementary Table 2). This effect is equivalent to larger CFM areas lifting 18 more 
households out of poverty per VDC than smaller CFM areas (S.E. = 0.65). This 155 
compares to 270 poor households in matched control VDCs (S.E. = 8.0), representing 
a relative poverty alleviation of 6.8% in VDCs with larger CFM area. Similarly, a 
longer duration of CFM arrangements (mean establishment duration > 3.4 years) led to 
significant reductions in deforestation (P = 0.012) and poverty (P < 0.001). These 
effects are equivalent to 1.2 hectares of avoided deforestation (S.E. = 0.34), and 14 160 
households lifted out of poverty (S.E. = 0.68). This compares to mean deforestation 
levels of 5.1 hectares (S.E. = 0.78) and poverty of 288 households (S.E. = 7.5) in 
matched control VDCs, representing a 24% relative reduction in deforestation and a 
4.8% relative reduction in poverty in VDCs with longer duration CFM arrangements. 
These results suggest that greater benefits result from longer-term investments and 165 
larger areas committed to decentralized CFM. 
Reductions in poverty can be driven by environmentally degrading natural 
resource extraction (e.g., unsustainable logging). We, therefore, analysed whether CFM 
leads to “win-win” outcomes to understand whether impacts on deforestation and 
poverty alleviation trade off. To do so, we constructed a three-level ordinal outcome 170 
variable, defining VDCs with lower than the median deforestation and higher than the 
median poverty alleviation rates as “win-win” outcomes9,10 (Fig. 2a, see Methods). We 
find that among matched VDCs, those with CFM had 58% higher probability of being 
linked to “win-win” outcomes relative to control VDCs (baseline win-win probability 
29%, P < 0.001, Fig. 2b, Supplementary Table 1), and a 38% lower probability of being 175 
linked to “lose-lose” outcomes relative to control VDCs (baseline lose-lose probability 
37%). Similarly, we find that among matched VDCs, those with CFM arrangements 
that had been in place for longer had a 5.6% higher probability of being linked to “win-
win” outcomes relative to control VDCs (baseline win-win probability 25%, P = 0.016), 
and 10% lower probability of being linked to “lose-lose” outcomes relative to control 180 
VDCs (baseline lose-lose probability 26%, Supplementary Fig. 1, Supplementary Table 
2). The above median deforestation and poverty alleviation values are conservative 
classifications of “win-win” outcomes. To validate the effect of CFM on “win-win” 
outcomes, we also analysed different “win-win” thresholds (upper quartiles), a 
continuous joint outcome index, and datasets generated using decile deviations from 185 
median forest cover change and poverty alleviation values to establish whether outliers 
influenced our results (Supplementary Information) – all robustness checks led to 
similar results. These results build on recent efforts that evaluate either forest or poverty 
outcomes of CFM12,13,15,16, and suggest that CFM has jointly improved social and 
environmental conditions in Nepal in the most recent decade. 190 
Finally, we investigated how baseline poverty moderates the effects of CFM on 
forest and poverty outcomes. This analysis is important because the majority of 
community forests in Nepal have been established in less poor VDCs (Fig. 3b and 
Supplementary Fig. 2). Among matched VDCs, we find that community forests in 
VDCs with higher levels of baseline poverty (2001) have a lower reduced deforestation 195 
effect compared to community forests in VDCs with lower levels of baseline poverty 
(P < 0.001, Fig. 3a, Supplementary Table 1). These results suggest that new CFM 
established in poorer areas likely requires additional support to minimize 
socioeconomic and environmental trade-offs 
Our analysis contributes to crucial debates in the literature by finding that CFM 200 
has contributed to lower deforestation levels and poverty alleviation through one of the 
world’s largest and longest standing decentralised forest management programmes5. 
The magnitude of socioeconomic and environmental benefits that we observe are 
similar to those attributable to other forest-based conservation and development 
interventions in other countries, such as payment for ecosystem services in Mexico33, 205 
and have the potential to be self-funding in the long term. Although our results are 
specific to Nepal’s case and similar studies would need to be undertaken in other 
contexts, our findings indicate the potential for CFM as a conservation and poverty 
alleviation strategy by estimating the specific impacts of CFM on forest cover change 
and poverty alleviation.  210 
Communities manage an increasing amount of the world’s forests globally, yet 
assessments of CFM outcomes are geographically skewed towards South Asian 
studies5. Social and environmental data are increasingly available at higher temporal 
and spatial resolutions, and future work should thus continue to estimate the large-scale 
joint social and environmental outcomes of CFM programmes in other countries. Yet 215 
large-scale analyses focusing on average treatment effects, such as the one we present 
here, also potentially mask variations in outcomes: CFM has not led to uniform 
reductions in deforestation and poverty (Figure 2a). We find that baseline poverty levels 
significantly affected CFM’s ability to curb deforestation. Future efforts should 
continue seeking a better understanding of other factors driving variation in CFM 220 
impacts both across and within community forest user groups. 
Unlike programmes in Mexico28 or Madagascar12, community forestry in Nepal 
has mainly not been managed for commercial markets34, but there is still great 
heterogeneity in CFM arrangements in Nepal and some communities have raised 
substantial revenue. Future analyses should thus also use more detailed household data 225 
to understand how market forces and commercial forestry influence livelihood 
decisions and CFM outcomes. Given the complexity of deforestation and reforestation 
drivers and patterns, future analyses would benefit from investment in detailed CFM 
boundary data and improved land cover monitoring (including forest degradation).  
Finally, decentralised forestry programmes between35 and within countries36 230 
(including in Nepal) vary substantially in remit and governance structures that can 
substantially affect social and environmental outcomes. Future work should pay closer 
attention to understanding how different variants of decentralized forest management 
(and which aspects of difference) influence outcomes. A critically important analytical 
horizon concerns how (in terms of effect sizes) decentralised regimes compare to more 235 
centralized forms of forest management, such as national or even supranational 
protected areas37, other policy interventions such as sustainability certification or 
payments for ecosystem services33, as well as broader socio-economic and 
demographic shifts (e.g., international migration) which have also been linked to 
substantial changes in livelihoods and land cover38.  240 
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Methods 
Our analysis relies on the construction of a longitudinal dataset using publicly available 260 
global- and national-level datasets, and a series of statistical analyses using variation in 
CFM conditional on multiple controls to estimate impacts. Additional robustness 
checks are available in the Supplementary Information. 
 
Dataset 265 
Unit of analysis. Previous similar studies of impact estimations have predominantly 
used spatially explicit datasets on the interventions being assessed (e.g., protected 
areas23 or land titles24). Such a spatially explicit dataset does not exist for Nepal’s 
>18,000 community forests. Furthermore, data for many other variables - including 
poverty estimates and other data derived from the national census - can only be 270 
compiled at the level of individual VDCs. We therefore use VDCs as our unit of 
analysis. We compiled data on 3832 of Nepal’s 3973 VDCs identified by an official 
VDC-level shapefile from Nepal’s Department of Home Affairs. While our analyses 
cannot account for intra-VDC variation, our sample is sufficiently large to identify 
statistical relationships. Note that we excluded 141 VDCs from our analysis, including 275 
129 VDCs not sampled in the 2001 census due to the armed conflict (Maoist 
insurgency), and 12 VDCs where the area under reported CFM was greater than the 
total area of the VDC. Including the 12 additional VDCs as a robustness check made 
no substantive differences to the results from our statistical analyses or to the 
conclusions drawn from them. 280 
 
Outcomes 
Forest cover change. We used the high-resolution forest cover change dataset v1.039 
to assess changes in the amount of forested area (forest cover change) between 2000 
and 2012. This dataset measures stand replacement (i.e., forest presence or absence, 285 
and does not include measures of degradation (i.e., forest quality). Measures of tree 
cover loss and tree cover gain are available as separate data files: to generate a measure 
of net change we first calculated the number of hectares lost and gained in each VDC 
and then expressed the difference between the two as percentages relative to baseline 
forest cover. Our measures of forest cover change clustered around zero with high 290 
kurtosis, and we used a Lambert W transformation to correct the variable’s distribution 
and reduce the influence of outliers40. Average marginal effects were calculated using 
back-transformed values. We conduct a series of robustness tests using the individual 
forest gain and loss datasets, and with an additional forest cover change data produced 
by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in Nepal 295 
(Supplementary Information). Results from these tests all support the findings from our 
main analysis. 
 
Poverty. The Nepal 2001 and 2011 national census is the only representative national 
household survey, that we are aware of, that can be used to generate country-scale 300 
longitudinal measures of socioeconomic variables at the level of individual VDCs (our 
unit of analysis). We use data from both censuses to generate poverty measures for our 
analysis. The census does not contain household income or consumption estimates, 
which are often used to measure poverty. However, poverty is increasingly considered 
a complex and multidimensional concept encompassing more dimensions than the 305 
traditionally used measures of household income and consumption41,42. We use the 
Alkire and Foster method43 to generate a multi-dimensional poverty index (MPI) that 
is similar to the global MPI generated by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative (OPHI). Like OPHI’s index, our MPI includes health, education and living 
standards dimensions, although individual indicators differ slightly due to data 310 
availability. We gave equal weighting to the three dimensions (33.3%), and equal 
weighting to indicators within each dimension (8.3% or 16.6%, depending on the 
number of indicators in each dimension). We treated missing data in the same way as 
Alkire and Santos44. 
The health dimension included i) child mortality, measured as the proportion of 315 
households experiencing the death of one or more children (aged ≤ 5 years), and ii) 
premature mortality, measured as the proportion of households experiencing a 
household death below the period life expectancy. 
The education dimension included i) school attendance, measured as the 
proportion of households with at least one school-aged child (aged 6 - 16 years) not 320 
attending school, and ii) years of schooling, measured as the proportion of households 
with at least one person, aged 11 years or older, with less than 5 years of schooling. 
The living standards dimension included the proportion of households using i) 
dung or wood as cooking fuel, and the proportion of households lacking access to ii) 
electricity, iii), clean water (according to Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) 325 
guidelines45 and used by the OPHI’s global MPI), and iv) improved sanitation 
(according to Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) guidelines45 and used by OPHI’s 
global MPI) 
We calculate the incidence, or head count ratio (H), of poverty in each VDC 
and use this measure in our principal analysis. We follow the method proposed by 330 
Alkire and Foster43: we aggregate indicators at the household level and define a 
household as being poor if the sum of weighted indicators within or across dimensions 
(k) is equal to or larger than 33.3%. We then calculate the incidence of poverty in each 
VDC relative to the total number of households sampled in each census. We use the 
incidence of poverty because international donors commonly use the number of people 335 
benefiting from an intervention as a key performance indicator46. However, we also 
compute a combined measure of incidence and intensity (M0)
43 as a robustness test 
(results are equivalent, see Supplementary Table 9). To calculate M0, we first generated 
a household-level intensity measure by summing up the number of indicators that a 
household was deprived in and then dividing this number by the total number of 340 
indicators (N = 8; Health dimension = 2, Education dimension = 2, Livelihood standard 
dimension = 4). We then calculated the average intensity of poverty in each VDC (A), 
and calculated M0 as H*A. 
We measured levels of poverty at baseline (2001), which we used as a covariate 
in our analysis (see below), and changes in poverty between 2001 - 2011, which we 345 
used as one of our principal outcome variables. We assess whether our measure is 
reflective of household consumption as a validity check by comparing District-level 
measures of our 2011 MPI (H) to a district-level consumption-derived poverty index47 
generated by the World Bank and Nepal’s Central Bureau of Statistics using data from 
the 2011 Nepal Livelihoods Standards Survey (NLSS). The indices were highly 350 
correlated (r = 0.68, N = 75, Supplementary Fig. 17) suggesting that our MPI is 
reflective of household consumption. 
 
Win-Win outcomes. We use the approach used by Persha et al.9 and Chhatre and 
Agrawal10 to construct a three-level, joint outcome ordinal variable. We use median 355 
deforestation and poverty estimates as cut-offs between levels. We define VDCs with 
lower than the median deforestation and higher than the median poverty alleviation 
rates as “win-win” outcomes (Fig. 2a). We define VDCs with higher than the median 
deforestation and lower than the median poverty alleviation as “lose-lose” outcomes, 
and the remaining two deforestation and poverty alleviation combinations as 360 
“tradeoffs”. Please refer to the Supplementary Information for robustness checks 
related to this definition of joint outcomes.  
 
Treatment 
Community forest management. CFM can lead to reductions in deforestation and 365 
poverty through several complex direct and indirect mechanisms. For example, rights 
to land and resources, and the autonomy to make resource management decisions 
promote collective action and the design, establishment and enforcement of local 
resource management rules48. Forest dependent households can gain substantial 
commercial and subsistence benefits from forests in the form of timber, construction 370 
materials, firewood, food, and medicinal plants49, and also fodder for livestock and 
composting materials for agriculture29,30. The implementation and enforcement of local 
management rules can lead to more equitable and sustainable management decisions. 
In some instances, communities also generate community-level income streams to fund 
community-level infrastructure improvements (e.g., schools and health posts) by 375 
establishing internal levies for forest products (note that although levies can contribute 
to broader benefits they can disproportionally burden those unable to afford them32). 
More sustainable forest management can enhance soil fertility, agricultural 
productivity, livestock production, and commercialisation of forest products through 
forest-based enterprises that can account for as much as half of a household’s 380 
income29,31. CFM livelihood benefits could be reflected by better health and educational 
outcomes (e.g., through better food and nutritional security, and financial solvency to 
access healthcare and education), and investments in living standards improvements 
(e.g., improved access to electricity, sanitation, and water), which are often the focus 
on international donor funded projects in Nepal25. At the same time, CFM management 385 
rules can lead to land and resource use restrictions, and subsequent reductions in 
agricultural expansion, logging, and forest product extraction50. Similarly, livelihood 
improvements can reduce forest dependence. More sustainable forest resource use and 
livelihood improvements, either in combination or isolation, can thus lead to less 
deforestation, forest degradation and faster reforestation rates. 390 
For each VDC, we used the information held in Nepal’s Department of Forest’s 
database on community forest user groups (CFUGs) to calculate i) the area under CFM 
(relative to VDC size), and ii) the mean numbers of years since CFM arrangements 
were set in place. We excluded CFUGs with missing data on VDC location, amount of 
area under community forest management, or establishment dates. Our final sample 395 
included information for 96% of all CFUGs held in the database (17,735 of 18,321 
CFUGs). Some CFUGs held in the database might no longer be active. It is thus 
possible that we might be considering some areas as treated which effectively are not. 
However, this should bias our results towards finding no effect of CFUGs, rather than 
biasing the results towards the conclusions that we make. 400 
We used the information from the database to conduct several analyses. First, 
we compare forest and poverty outcomes in VDCs with and without CFM. We use data 
from community forests established prior to 2000 for our main analyses 
(Supplementary Table 1) because i) as many as 80% of all CFUGs were established in 
the run-up to 200025 - our baseline year. Our estimates thus represent impacts due to 405 
CFM between 2000/1-2011/2; ii) because CFUGs were established in only 512 VDCs 
after 2000, and iii) because a significant number of community forests in our final 
sample (3341, equivalent to 38% of all CFUGs established after 2000) were established 
after 2006, and perhaps too close to the end of our study period (within 5 years from 
the 2011 national census and 6 years from the high-resolution forest cover change 410 
dataset) to observe significant gains in forest cover and poverty alleviation. We conduct 
two separate but parallel robustness tests. Our first test uses data on community forests 
established after 2000. This analysis does not suffer from potential feedback from 
treatment to control variables and corroborate our results (Supplementary Table 10). In 
our second test, we iteratively increase the area under CFM to assign treatment VDCs 415 
(10, 15, 20 and 25% of VDC area under CFM). Doing so provides sharper distinctions 
between areas with CFM and those without (results from this robustness test support 
our main findings). 
Second, we analyze the effect of the area under CFM and the duration of CFM 
arrangements using the subset of VDCs that established community forests prior to 420 
2000. We create two sets of binary treatment variables - one for CFM area and one for 
CFM duration - that we use for our matching pre-processing. We use median values 
(8% of VDC area under CFM, 3.4 years since the establishment of CFM arrangements) 
to generate equally sized treatment and control groups. 
 425 
 
Matching Covariates 
There are a range of biophysical and socio-economic covariates that can potentially 
influence CFM (selection into the treatment) and our two outcome variables21,51, and 
we control for these in our analysis in both our matching and subsequent regression 430 
analysis. Our selection is based on known drivers of forest cover change19,52, factors 
known to affect poverty outcomes of conservation policies22, and variables thought to 
influence locations of CFM identified as part of a global systematic review of CFM5 as 
well as Nepal-related reports25,26. 
 435 
Area. Area size has been previously associated with poverty outcomes of protected 
areas22. 
 
Baseline forest cover. We expressed baseline forest cover in each VDC as the 
proportion of forested area in 2000. 440 
 
Baseline poverty. We use our 2001 census-generated MPI to control for baseline levels 
of poverty. We also examine the moderating effect of baseline poverty on community 
forest management using a baseline poverty and treatment interaction term. 
 445 
Slope and elevation. We used the ASTER DEM v253 to calculate mean elevation and 
slope in each VDC because both can affect agricultural suitability, forest dynamics, and 
livelihood decision54 
 
Precipitation. Agricultural production and forest dynamics are affected by 450 
precipitation. We used the WorldClim current precipitation (v1.4, 1950 - 2000) 
dataset55 to assess mean precipitation levels in individual VDCs. 
 
Population density. Resource overexploitation has been linked to population pressure 
and can drive rural migration patterns as people seek less degraded areas19. To control 455 
for this and urbanization, we include a measure of baseline population density (2001) 
in each VDC using data from Nepal’s national census. 
 
Agricultural effort. Agriculture is a principal driver of deforestation and land-cover 
change, globally19. We use the 2001 national census of Nepal to generate a baseline 460 
measure of agricultural activity, which we expressed as the total number of months 
dedicated to agriculture by above school age household members (> 16 years), divided 
by the number of sampled households in each VDC. 
 
International migration. Nepal has high rates of international migration and 465 
remittances that have had substantial effects on livelihoods and forest cover37, 56. To 
control for the effects of international migration we use a proxy for remittance income: 
data from the 2001 national census of Nepal to measure the proportion of households 
within each year with at least one or more household members above school age (> 16 
years) living abroad.  470 
 
Travel time to population and administrative centers. Access to services (e.g., 
technical assistance), markets and nodes of transport can influence livelihood decisions 
and land-use patterns19. We measure travel time to district headquarters and population 
centers with ≥ 10,000 and ≥ 50,000 inhabitants by adapting the European Commission’s 475 
Joint Research Centre’s (JRC) travel time to major cities algorithm57, and combining 
that with Nepal’s Survey Departments road data and the JRC’s global land cover 
dataset58. We used the ASTER DEM v251 to compute elevation and slope correction 
factors and used VDC centroids as points of departure for all our calculations. 
 480 
Administrative areas. Districts are the administrative level above VDCs and have 
significant decision-making autonomy. Most donor-funded interventions and 
government programmes are implemented at this administrative level, and some 
Districts were particularly affected by the Maoist insurgency during the 1990’s and 
early 2000’s59. We included District as a dummy matching covariate and fixed effect 485 
in our post-matching regression to control for these and other potentially unobserved 
factors that are likely to be common to specific Districts. 
 
Protected areas. VDCs inside protected areas and buffer zones are likely to be affected 
by different natural resource management legislation, state funding and tourism. We 490 
use the World Database on Protected Areas60 to identify VDCs inside protected areas 
and buffer zones and included a dummy variable to control for these effects. 
 
Analysis 
Matching preprocessing and regression analysis 495 
We used a statistical matching and regression approach to estimate the relationship 
between community forest management, and changes in forest cover and poverty21,49. 
Our approach estimates impacts using conditional variation in CFM between VDCs 
within the same district after controlling for confounders (see below). We use a form 
of propensity score matching (optimal full matching) that is particularly well suited for 500 
balanced datasets (such as ours)49,61. Post-matching regression results of our three 
treatments (presence, size and duration) are shown in Supplementary Tables 1 and 2. 
 We used R62 for all our statistical analyses and the “MatchIt” package63 for our 
statistical matching. We assessed covariate balance before and after matching, 
considering a post-matching standardized mean difference of < 0.25 as an acceptable 505 
propensity score and covariate balance between treatment and controls groups49. 
Matching significantly improved the balance between all treatment and control groups 
in the various datasets used in our analysis (Supplementary Figures 3-7 Supplementary 
Tables 3-7). However, because matching approaches cannot provide perfectly balanced 
datasets, we also included all matching covariates in our subsequent linear and ordinal 510 
regressions (i.e. a full model) to control for any remaining differences between our 
treatment and control groups.  
We estimate predicted levels of net deforestation (in number of hectares per 
VDC) and poverty alleviation (in number of households lifted out of poverty per VDC) 
in the presence and absence of CFM, among the VDCs where CFM exists. The mean 515 
difference between these predicted values is equivalent to the Average Marginal 
Effect. We report the standard error of these estimates as a measure of the uncertainty 
in those estimates. We also report how these effects compare to the mean deforestation 
and poverty alleviation values in control VDCs, expressing these effects in percentage 
change terms. We calculate heteroskedasticity robust (Huber-White) standard errors 520 
using the “robcov” function in the “rms” package64. 
To assess the moderating effect of baseline poverty on CFM, we include a 
treatment (CFM prior to 2000 for our main analyses, CFM after 2000 for our robustness 
test) and baseline poverty interaction term (Supplementary Tables 1 and 10). To control 
for non-linearity of the effect of baseline poverty we also include a squared baseline 525 
poverty interaction term. 
 
Identification strategy 
A key assumption to establish causal inference based on our methods is that, 
once confounding factors have been controlled for, treatment allocation is “as if” 530 
random. We believe this is a plausible assumption in our case because of the history of 
CFM establishment within Nepal25,26. Over the past thirty years, international donors 
have contributed more than US$ 237 million to support community forest management 
in Nepal, with an additional US$ 8 million in funding provided by the government of 
Nepal. A rapid increase in CFM occurred after the passage of the 1993 Forest Act25,26, 535 
which established formal mechanisms for devolution of power to CFUGs. Donor-
supported programmes targeted different (but sometimes overlapping) areas of the 
country throughout this period25. Efforts spread mainly in the middle hills, which had 
historically experienced large amounts of deforestation. From our discussions with 
international donor agencies, areas for interventions were often selected on the basis of 540 
programme priorities (e.g. more development focused or more environment focused), 
and the process of approaching villages depended on somewhat random factors, such 
as whether staff of implementing agencies had contacts in particular villages. The 
government of Nepal also experienced considerable political instability and changes in 
priorities throughout this entire period. This externally driven, decentralized, and 545 
uncoordinated process of CFM support creates a plausible source of variation that is 
uncorrelated with CFM conditional on included controls. 
We attempt to control and test for the ways in which these interventions could 
have been systematic or systematically correlated with other important drivers of 
outcomes. Given that CFM has often been led by motivations to address historically 550 
high deforestation rates - particularly in the middle hills, we include matching 
covariates related to deforestation rates, such as slope, elevation, and distance to market 
centres. We have similarly included covariates that might influence the targeting of 
community forests, including access to district headquarters, and baseline estimates of 
poverty and forest cover, which have been an emphasis of donor-funded programmes. 555 
We include District-level fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant 
factors common to each district, such as high levels of migration, urbanization or 
impacts of the Maoist insurgency (although note that some prior research suggests that 
community forest user groups were resilient to the insurgency65). We also conduct a 
series of additional robustness checks that support our core findings (see Supplementary 560 
Information). 
We test that the conditional treatment (presence, duration of, and area under 
CFM arrangements) does appear to be random, and that our post-matching regression 
models do not suffer from spatial-autocorrelation. We do so by conducting Moran’s I 
spatial auto-correlation tests, and performing visual inspections of spatial distribution 565 
patterns of regression residuals, and variograms. We use the “spdep” package66 for our 
Moran’s I tests, and the “gstat” package67 to generate variograms. 
To test for spatial auto-correlation of our treatment variables, we model our 
treatment variable as either a null model (yn = 1), or as a function of our matching 
covariates. These latter models are equivalent to those used to calculate propensity 570 
scores. As expected, we observe a distinct spatial pattern before controlling for 
covariates, highlighting a higher likelihood of CFM in the middle hills. Moran’s I tests 
and visual inspections of model residual distributions and variograms show that the 
spatial auto-correlation of our treatment variables decreased significantly after 
controlling for our matching covariates, and that the spatial distribution of the three 575 
treatment variables (presence, area, and duration of CFM) used in our post-matching 
regressions is close to random (Supplementary Table 8, Supplementary Figures 8, 9). 
Spatial auto-correlation tests of our post-matching regression models also show no 
spatial auto-correlation (Supplementary Table 8, Supplementary Figures 10-15). We 
interpret the results of these tests as consistent with the assumption that remaining 580 
sources of variation in treatment are plausibly exogenous.  
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
Since our identification strategy relies on assumptions about the process of CFM 
establishment that are untestable, it is still possible that important confounders (e.g., 585 
other interventions or government programmes) remain. We thus perform a series of 
hidden bias sensitivity analyses on our principal models to determine the potential 
importance of unobserved confounders for our results. We use the “causalsens” 
package68, which has the additional benefit over other sensitivity approaches (e.g., 
Rosenbaum bounds69) of being able to determine how hidden bias alters both the 590 
magnitude and direction of causal estimates. Results from these sensitivity analyses 
(Supplementary Figures 10-15) suggest that to reduce the average treatment effect to 
zero, non-measured confounders would have to explain at least as much variation, or 
substantially more, than the median variation explained by most measured covariates. 
Together with our spatial auto-correlation tests (see above), we interpret these results 595 
as suggesting that our models are moderately to strongly robust against hidden bias. 
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Figure 1 | Distribution of community forests in Nepal and mean post-matching differences 795 
in forest cover change and poverty alleviation due to community forest management 
arrangements. a-c, Area under community forest management in the 3823 Village 
Development Committees (VDCs – our unit of analysis) included in our sample. The data are 
presented as deciles. White areas represent excluded VDCs and hashed areas represent 
protected areas and buffer zones (see methods) (a). Post-matching differences in forest cover 800 
change (b) and poverty alleviation (c) comparing VDCs with (T = Treatment) and without (C 
= Controls) community forests (CF), and VDCs with large (T) and small (C) amounts of area 
under community forest management, as well as VDCs in which community forest 
management arrangements have been in place for long (T) and short (C) durations. Estimates 
were generated using predicted values used to estimate marginal effects and stars indicate post-805 
matching linear regression results that are significantly different from zero (Supplementary 
Table 1). ***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05. 
 
 Figure 2 | Categorization and percentage mean difference in the likelihood of outcome for 810 
all different joint outcomes as function of presence or absence of community forest 
management. a-b, Median unmatched forest cover change and poverty alleviation values were 
used to generate an ordinal variable categorizing joint win-win (blue), tradeoff (yellow) and 
lose-lose (grey) outcomes (a). Areas with community forest (T) were 57.9% more likely to lead 
to win-win outcomes and 38.1% less likely to lead to lose-lose outcomes than areas without 815 
community forests (C). (Joint outcome logit coef. = 0.344, S.E. = 0.0714, P < 0.0001) (b).  
 
Figure 3 | Changes in predicted deforestation values and likelihood of VDCs having 
community forestry arrangements along increases in baseline poverty (2001) a-b, 
Predicted percent forest cover change in areas with (solid green line) and without community 820 
forests (green dashed line). The difference between both lines (dotted black line) shows the 
decreasing effect of community forest management on reductions in deforestation with 
increases in baseline poverty (a). Likelihood VDCs having community forestry arrangements 
(purple line) and frequency density plot of baseline poverty (blue line and area), showing that 
community forests are more likely to occur in less poor areas (b). Likelihood of community 825 
forest management arrangements corresponds to matching propensity scores. Both the 
predicted probabilities and frequency densities were calculated using the unmatched dataset. 
Lines and 95% confidence intervals (shaded areas) were generated using a LOESS smoothing 
function. 
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Supplementary Information 
Robustness tests 
We conducted several robustness tests to confirm the validity of our principal results 
that community forest management has driven joint reductions in both poverty and 
deforestation. 835 
 We first separately analyze the forest loss (deforestation) and gain 
(reforestation) layers of the high-resolution forest cover change dataset v1.034. Both 
datasets were negatively skewed and were log transformed for analysis (0.1 was added 
to all values to account for 0). While there were no post-matching differences in 
deforestation between Village Development Committees with and without Community 840 
Forest Management (CFM) (Coef. = 0.07, SE = 0.04), we find that CFM VDCs had 
significantly higher levels of tree cover gain than VDCs with no CFM (Coef. = 0.22, 
SE = 0.04, P < 0.0001). These results corroborate findings from our net forest cover 
change analysis. 
 Further, validating global remote sensing products like v1.0 is challenging37,70. 845 
We, therefore, use an additional Landsat-derived forest cover change dataset71 
generated by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) 
in Nepal to confirm that community forest management has led to positive forest 
outcomes. Classification accuracy for the ICIMOD dataset ranges from 70-83%, 
depending on forest type. Baseline (2000) forest cover estimates of the v1.0 and 850 
ICIMOD datasets are highly correlated (r = 0.90).  
Supplementary Figure 16a maps the difference between the v1.0 and ICIMOD 
datasets to show the spatial pattern at the VDC level. To the extent that there is a spatial 
pattern in the data, it suggests that the ICIMOD dataset underestimates deforestation in 
parts of the middle hills and overestimate deforestation in the tropical lowlands relative 855 
to the global forest cover change dataset v1.0. These spatial patterns could be 
attributable, at least in part, to inherent large ecological differences between forests in 
the two regions27, and the way in which both remote sensing efforts categorise forests.  
To understand how this may affect our results, we examined the spatial pattern 
of the differences. Differences in cover change estimates, calculated as the proportion 860 
cover change estimated using high-resolution forest cover change dataset v1.0 - the 
proportion cover change using the ICIMOD dataset, are not spatially auto-correlated 
when calculated across the entire dataset (Moran’s I = 0.011, Standard deviate = 0.82, 
P = 0.21, n = 3832). Critically, these differences are uncorrelated with the regression 
residuals of the model used to estimate the propensity score of our main treatment 865 
variable (r = 0.002), and a post-matching regression shows no significant relationship 
between the presence of community forest management and differences between 
datasets (Coef. = -0.0005, S.E. = 0.0007, P = 0.52). This suggests that these differences 
are unlikely to bias our results.  
However, the differences between datasets cluster around zero (Supplementary 870 
Figure 16b) and approximately 73% of VDCs fall within ± 0.05 from the median 
difference (-0.02) between datasets (Supplementary Figure 16c). We thus also conduct 
a spatial auto-correlation test for a subset of the data falling within ± 0.05 from the 
median difference between datasets.  Results using this subset suggest that differences 
between forest cover change estimates are spatially auto-correlated in a substantial 875 
proportion of our dataset (Moran’s I = 0.18, Standard deviate = 8.9, P < 0.001, n = 
2816). These differences remain uncorrelated with the regression residuals of the model 
used to estimate the propensity score of our main treatment variable (r = -0.025), and a 
post-matching regression also shows no significant relationship between the presence 
of community forest management and differences between datasets (Coef. = -0.09, S.E. 880 
= 0.09, P = 0.33).  
Ultimately, these differences highlight the need to corroborate our principal 
findings: that community forest management is associated with significant reductions 
in deforestation - using the dataset generated by ICIMOD. Results from a post-matching 
regression using ICIMOD forest cover change estimates instead of the v1.0 data, 885 
confirm that community forest led to significant positive forest outcomes (Coef = 0.110, 
S.E. = 0.048, P = 0.022, Supplementary Figure 7, Supplementary Tables 7 & 9). Post-
matching regression residuals do not exhibit spatial auto-correlation (Moran’s I = -
0.002, Standard deviate = 0.32, P = 0.75, Supplementary Figure 11a, b), and our results 
are moderately to strongly robust to hidden bias (Supplementary Figure 11c, d). These 890 
results confirm that our main findings are not dependent on which dataset is used. This 
is likely due to the fact that our analytical approach uses biophysical conditions, 
including elevation, slope, and precipitation that are inherently different between the 
Terai and Middle Hills, to select matching treatment and control units that capture these 
key differences. Note that neither of the products we use here use the Nepal Forest 895 
Resource Assessment definition of forests, which is similar to the FAO’s forest 
definition71, and classifies forests as areas that are i) ≥ 0.5 ha in size, ii) > 20 m wide, 
iii) have > 10% canopy cover, iv) tree heights of 5m at maturity. The use of a remote 
sensing product that uses FAO forest definitions would provide results that are more 
easily comparable to those generated by the Nepal Forest Resource Assessment27. 900 
 For our second set of robustness tests, we first focus on VDCs in which 
community forests were only established after 2000 to evaluate the effect of CFM on 
deforestation and poverty (i.e., we know that for these sites treatment, CFM, occurred 
in between our measures of forest/poverty and so these analyses do not suffer from 
potential effects of our treatment variable influencing baseline values). Among matched 905 
VDCs, we find that those with CFM had less deforestation and significantly more 
households moving out of poverty (Supplementary Table 10). While the effect on 
deforestation is not statistically significant (although note the strong impact of CFM 
duration, which suggests this analysis is less likely to pick up significant results), we 
find a similar moderating effect of baseline poverty on deforestation, with CFM in 910 
poorer areas avoiding significantly less deforestation than CFM in less poor areas. 
Furthermore, we find a similar bias in where community forests were established, with 
poorer VDCs being less likely to have CFM arrangements (Supplementary Figure 2). 
Given that a significant number of VDCs were established within six years of the end 
of our study period for deforestation and that the sample size of VDCs that established 915 
CFM after 2000 is substantially smaller than VDCs established prior to 2000, we 
interpret these results as confirming those of our principal analysis. 
 We also iteratively increase the areas under CFM to assign our treatment. We 
use 10, 15, 20 and 25% of VDC area under CFM as thresholds, which provides a sharper 
distinction between areas with and without CFM. Since we do not find effects of CFM 920 
area on our measure of forest cover change (Figure 1, Supplementary Table 2), we focus 
this robustness test on our measure of poverty. We find that increasing the treatment 
threshold increases the effects size of CFM on our poverty outcome (Supplementary 
Figure 17, Supplementary Table 11) 
 For our third set of robustness tests we use several different approaches to 925 
confirm that community forests management led to joint positive outcomes. In all 
instances these robustness tests confirm that CFM leads to joint reductions in 
deforestation and poverty. First, we tighten our definition of “win-win” outcomes and 
use the upper quartiles of forest cover change and poverty alleviation in our unmatched 
dataset to generate our ordinal “win-win”, “tradeoff” and “lose-lose” variable. As in 930 
our main analysis focusing on medians to generate thresholds, we find that among 
matched VDCs, CFM was positively and significantly associated with joint positive 
outcomes (Logit coef. = 0.33, S.E. = 0.079, P < 0.001, Supplementary Table 12).  
Second, we generated a joint forest cover change and poverty alleviation index 
using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and used the first principal component as 935 
our index. The first principal component explained 52 and 53% of the variation among 
the two outcome variables (forest and poverty) in both our unmatched and matched 
datasets respectively, and was highly correlated with both variables (r = 0.72 for our 
unmatched dataset, and r = 0.72 for our matched dataset). Again, among matched 
VDCs, those with CFM were more likely to lead to positive joint outcomes (Coef. = 940 
0.16, S.E. = 0.026, P < 0.001, Supplementary Table 13). 
Third, we performed a sensitivity analysis to assess whether the effect of CFM 
on our median values generated ordinal joint outcome measure was due to the effect of 
outliers. To do so, we ran a series of iterative matched regressions on consecutively 
shrinking datasets generated using decile deviations from median forest cover change 945 
and poverty alleviation values (Supplementary Figure 19). We find that, among 
matched VDCs, our results that CFM leads to positive joint outcomes hold if more than 
70% of our dataset is retained (Supplementary Table 14). 
Nepal can be divided into distinct ecological zones that run North to South 
(High mountains, Middle hills, and Terai) and was until the 2015 constitutional change 950 
subdivided into five distinct development regions which ran from West to East. In our 
main analysis we control for climatic and biophysical changes by including altitude, 
slope and precipitation measures for individual VDCs and control for possible effects 
of differences between District, which have been responsible for coordinating the work 
of international donors, field agencies and government ministries. In our final 955 
robustness test we also include ecological zones and development regions as covariates. 
Results from our post-matching regression yield almost identical results to those of our 
main analysis (forest cover change coef. = 0.016, S.E. = 0.006, P = 0.004; poverty 
alleviation coef. = 2.0, S.E. = 0.35, P < 0.0001). We also run a model in which we 
replace ecological zone (longitude) and development region (latitude) with VDC 960 
centroid latitude and longitude coordinates. Results from these analyses are also similar 
to those from our main analysis (forest cover change coef. = 0.023, S.E. = 0.006, P = 
0.0002; poverty alleviation coef. = 1.3, S.E. = 0.36, P = 0.0004).  
  
Supplementary Table 1 | Average effects of forest cover change and poverty reduction 965 
across all Village Development Communities (VDCs) as a function of community forest 
management arrangements established prior to 2001. 
  No Interaction  Interaction  Squared interaction 
 
Before Matching 
(T=2138, C=1694) 
After Matching 
(T=1960, C=1468) 
Forest cover change [2000-12]§     
Treatment: CF [Yes] 0.011 (0.008) [0.008] 0.016 (0.006)** [0.005] 0.078 (0.017)*** [0.015] 0.052 (0.011)*** [0.009] 
Poverty [2001] 0.004 (0.020) [0.002] -0.021 (0.021) [0.020] 0.037 (0.026) [0.027] 0.015 (0.022) [0.023] 
CF [Yes] * Poverty [2001]   -0.10 (0.028)*** [0.025] -0.093 (0.025)*** [0.021] 
Forest loss (ha, controls)  -5.0 (1.0)   
Average marginal effect (ha)  1.6 (0.83)   
Relative difference (%)  -33   
[Adjusted R2] 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 
Poverty alleviation [2001-2011]     
Treatment: CF [Yes] 2.5 (0.46)*** [0.049] 2.0 (0.35)*** [0.36] 1.4 (1.1) [0.98] 2.0 (0.71)** [0.68] 
Poverty [2001] 47 (1.1)*** [1.4] 53 (1.3)*** [1.5] 53 (1.6)*** [2.0] 40 (1.4)*** [1.8] 
CF [Yes] * Poverty [2001]   1.0 (1.7) [1.8] 0.73 (1.6) [1.7] 
Poverty alleviation (HH, controls)  316 (6.3)   
Average marginal effect (HH)  20 (0.62)   
Relative difference (%)  6.4   
[Adjusted R2] 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.43 
Joint outcome (ordinal)     
Treatment: CF [Yes] 0.25 (0.095)** 0.34 (0.071)***   
Win-win prob. (%): treat. (controls)  31 (19)   
Relative difference (%)  58   
Tradeoff prob. (%): treat. (controls)  46 (44)   
Relative difference (%)  6.6   
Lose-lose prob. (%): treat. (controls)  23 (37)   
Relative difference (%)  -38   
Residual deviance 6816 6095   
Values outside parentheses represent regression coefficients (average treatment effects); values in parentheses represent naïve 
standard errors; values in square brackets represent Huber-White corrected standard errors  
§Percentages of forest cover change were transformed using a Lambert W function. 970 
***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05  
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Supplementary Figure 1 | Categorization and percentage mean difference in the 975 
likelihood of outcome for all different joint outcomes as function of duration of 
community forest management. a-b, Median unmatched forest cover change and poverty 
alleviation values were used to generate an ordinal variable categorizing joint win-win (blue), 
tradeoff (yellow) and lose-lose (grey) outcomes (a). Areas with community forest (T) were 
5.67% more likely to lead to win-win outcomes and 9.87% less likely to lead to lose-lose 980 
outcomes than areas without community forests (C). (Joint outcome logit coef. = 0.225, S.E. = 
0.093, P = 0.0156) (b). 
  
 Supplementary Figure 2 | Likelihood of VDCs having community forestry arrangements 985 
established after 2000 and frequency density plot of baseline poverty. Likelihood VDCs 
having community forestry arrangements (purple line) and frequency density plot of baseline 
poverty (blue line and area), showing that community forests are more likely to occur in less 
poor areas (b). Both the predicted probabilities and frequency densities were calculated using 
the unmatched dataset. Lines and 95% confidence intervals (shaded areas) were generated using 990 
a LOESS smoothing function.  
Supplementary Table 2 | Average effects of forest cover change and poverty alleviation 
across all Village Development Communities (VDCs) as a function of community forest 
area and duration for community forests established prior to 2000. 
 Continuous Before Matching After Matching 
Forest cover change§ n = 2138   
CF area§§ -0.009 (0.005) [0.005]   
CF duration§§ 0.010 (0.005) [0.005]   
Adjusted R2 0.37   
Poverty alleviation    
CF area 0.68 (0.23)** [0.24]   
CF duration 0.76 (0.25)** [0.25]   
Adjusted R2 0.50   
Joint outcome (ordinal)    
CF area -0.033 (0.051)   
CF duration 0.11 (0.051)*   
Residual deviance 3723   
Forest cover change§  T=1069, C=1069 T=1053, C=1014 
CF area [Large]  -0.007 (0.009) [0.009] 0.007 (0.008) [0.008] 
Forest loss (ha, controls)   -6.5 (1.9) 
Average marginal effect (ha)   0.33 (0.065) 
Relative difference (%)   -5.2 
Adjusted R2  0.37 0.32 
Poverty alleviation    
CF area [Large]  1.1 (0.45)* [0.46] 1.8 (0.41)*** [0.40] 
Poverty alleviation (HH, controls)   270 (8.0) 
Average marginal effect (HH)   18 (0.65) 
Relative difference (%)   6.8 
Adjusted R2  0.50 0.55 
Joint outcome (ordinal)    
CF area [Large]  -0.050 (0.098) 0.11 (0.090) 
Residual deviance  3723 3531 
Forest cover change§  T=1068, C=1070 T=1049, C=978 
CF duration [Long]   0.024 (0.009)** [0.009] 0.020 (0.008)* [0.008] 
Net forest loss (ha, controls)   -5.1 (0.78) 
Average marginal effect (ha)   1.2 (0.34) 
Relative difference (%)   -24 
Adjusted R2  0.37 0.40 
Poverty alleviation    
CF duration [Long]  1.4 (0.45)** [0.44] 1.3 (0.39)*** [0.37] 
Net poverty alleviation (HH, controls)   288 (7.5) 
Average marginal effect (HH)   14 (0.68) 
Relative difference (%)   4.8 
Adjusted R2  0.50 0.58 
Joint outcome (ordinal)    
CF duration [Long]  0.17 (0.098) 0.22 (0.093)* 
Win-win prob. (%): treat. (controls)   26 (25) 
Relative difference (%)   5.6 
Tradeoff prob. (%): treat. (controls)   50 (49) 
Relative difference (%)   2.4 
Lose-lose prob. (%): treat.t (controls)   24 (26) 
Relative difference (%)   -10 
Residual deviance  3724 3372 
Values outside parentheses represent regression coefficients (average treatment effects); values in parentheses 995 
represent naïve standard errors; values in square brackets represent Huber-White corrected standard errors  
§Percentages of forest cover change were transformed using a Lambert W function. 
§§Variables are scaled 
***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05  
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 Supplementary Figure 3 | Covariate balance before and after full optimal matching using 
presence community forest management prior to 2000 as treatment. a-b, Standardized 
mean difference for the propensity score and all matching covariates before (open circles) and 
after matching (orange circles) (a). Balance results for District and IUCN category are 1005 
presented as means across all Districts and IUCN categories. Propensity score density 
distribution before and after matching for treatment (purple) and control (yellow) groups 
(overlaps between propensity score distributions are represented in grey) (b). Matching resulted 
in a much-improved overlap between propensity scores. 
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Supplementary Table 3 | Covariate balance before and after optimal full matching using 
VDCs with community forest management before 2000 as treatment. 
 Before matching After matching 
 
Means 
Treated  
(n = 2138) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1684) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Means 
Treated 
(n = 1959) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1460) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Propensity score 0.79 0.26 2.4 0.77 0.77 1.5e-4 
VDC size 3588 3526 0.010 3641 3506 0.021 
Baseline forest cover 0.48 0.22 1.2 0.47 0.49 -0.11 
Elevation 1385 649 0.97 1414 1436 -0.029 
Slope 24 11 1.8 24 25 -0.12 
Precipitation 144 129 0.39 142 141 0.024 
Baseline poverty 0.57 0.66 -0.44 0.58 0.59 -0.038 
Baseline agricultural effort 13 11 0.49 14 14 0.009 
Baseline population density 2.5 5.5 -1.1 2.5 2.3 0.071 
Baseline int. migration 0.16 0.082 0.55 0.15 0.16 -0.018 
Distance to Dist. HQ 3.8 3.1 0.21 3.9 4.0 -0.057 
Distance to pop. centre 10K  5.3 3.1 0.39 5.5 5.7 -0.038 
Distance to pop. centre 50K  12 8.0 0.37 12 13 -0.043 
IUCN category§ 0.17 0.17 -0.13 0.17 0.17 -0.011 
District§ 0.014 0.014 -0.12 0.014 0.014 1.8e-4 
§ Data are presented as the mean across all IUCN categories and Districts 
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 Supplementary Figure 4 | Covariate balance before and after full optimal matching using 
total area under community forest management prior to 2000 as treatment. a-b, 
Standardized mean difference for the propensity score and all matching covariates before (open 
circles) and after matching (orange circles) (a). Balance results for District and IUCN category 1020 
are presented as means across all Districts and IUCN categories. Propensity score density 
distribution before and after matching for treatment (purple) and control (yellow) groups 
(overlaps between propensity score distributions are represented in grey) (b). Matching resulted 
in a near-perfect overlap between propensity scores. 
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Supplementary Table 4 | Covariate balance before and after optimal full matching using 
community forest management area before 2000 as treatment. 
 Before matching After matching 
 
Means 
Treated  
(n = 1069) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1069) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Means 
Treated 
(n = 1053) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1014) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Propensity score 0.61 0.39 1.2 0.60 0.60 8.4e-4 
CF duration 3.7 3.3 0.26 3.6 3.6 0.027 
VDC size 2824 4352 -0.48 2834 2815 0.006 
Baseline forest cover 0.49 0.47 0.071 0.49 0.50 -0.031 
Elevation 1289 1480 -0.32 1293 1328 -0.060 
Slope 23 24 -0.083 23 24 -0.066 
Precipitation 147 141 0.18 147 149 -0.043 
Baseline poverty 0.55 0.59 -0.21 0.55 0.54 0.049 
Baseline agricultural effort 13 14 -0.14 13 13 -0.059 
Baseline population density 2.4 2.5 -0.009 2.4 2.3 0.059 
Baseline int. migration 0.16 0.16 0.031 0.16 0.17 -0.052 
Distance to Dist. HQ 3.1 4.5 -0.59 3.2 3.1 0.017 
Distance to pop. centre 10K  4.4 6.2 -0.45 4.4 4.5 -0.027 
Distance to pop. centre 50K  10 13 -0.31 10 11 -0.021 
IUCN category§ 0.20 0.20 0.011 0.20 0.20 -0.010 
District§ 0.014 0.014 -0.023 0.014 0.014 3.1e-4 
§ Data are presented as the mean across all IUCN categories and Districts   
1030 
Supplementary Figure 5 | Covariate balance before and after full optimal matching using 
duration of community forest management arrangements prior to 2000 as treatment. a-
b, Standardized mean difference for the propensity score and all matching covariates before 
(open circles) and after matching (orange circles) (a). Balance results for District and IUCN 
category are presented as means across all Districts and IUCN categories. Propensity score 1035 
density distribution before and after matching for treatment (purple) and control (yellow) 
groups (overlaps between propensity score distributions are represented in grey) (b). Matching 
resulted in a near-perfect overlap between propensity scores. 
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Supplementary Table 5 | Covariate balance before and after optimal full matching using 
community forest management duration before 2000 as treatment. 
 Before matching After matching 
 
Means 
Treated  
(n = 1068) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1070) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Means 
Treated 
(n = 1049) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 978) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Propensity score 0.61 0.39 1.1 0.60 0.60 5.6e-4 
CF area pre 2000 0.14 0.11 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.008 
VDC size 3136 4039 -0.22 2981 2909 0.017 
Baseline forest cover 0.47 0.49 -0.092 0.48 0.48 0.007 
Elevation 1449 1320 0.18 1418 1459 -0.059 
Slope 24 23 0.18 24 24 0.021 
Precipitation 145 142 0.080 147 144 0.070 
Baseline poverty 0.54 0.60 -0.30 0.55 0.54 0.030 
Baseline agricultural effort 14 13 0.057 14 13 0.095 
Baseline population density 2.5 2.4 0.017 2.5 3.0 -0.16 
Baseline int. migration 0.16 0.15 0.083 0.16 0.16 -0.002 
Distance to Dist. HQ 3.5 4.1 -0.16 3.4 3.4 -0.005 
Distance to pop. centre 10K  5.2 5.4 -0.046 5.0 5.3 -0.074 
Distance to pop. centre 50K  11 12 -0.12 11 12 -0.060 
IUCN category§ 0.20 0.20 -0.004 0.20 0.20 -0.005 
District§ 0.014 0.014 -0.025 0.014 0.014 -0.003 
§ Data are presented as the mean across all IUCN categories and Districts   
 
Supplementary Figure 6 | Covariate balance before and after full optimal matching using 1045 
presence of community forest management after 2000 as treatment. a-b, Standardized 
mean difference for the propensity score and all matching covariates before (open circles) and 
after matching (orange circles) (a). Balance results for District and IUCN category are 
presented as means across all Districts and IUCN categories. Propensity score density 
distribution before and after matching for treatment (purple) and control (yellow) groups 1050 
(overlaps between propensity score distributions are represented in grey) (b). Matching resulted 
in a much-improved overlap between propensity scores.  
 
 
Supplementary Table 6 | Covariate balance before and after optimal full matching using 1055 
community forest management after 2000 as treatment. 
 Before matching After matching 
 
Means 
Treated  
(n = 512) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1190) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Means 
Treated 
(n = 476) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1166) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Propensity score 0.66 0.15 1.8 0.62 0.62 3.2e-4 
VDC size 5048 2871 0.26 5037 5026 0.001 
Baseline forest cover 0.46 0.12 1.2 0.43 0.49 -0.21 
Elevation 1024 488 0.56 1013 1261 -0.26 
Slope 18 8.3 0.94 18 20 -0.22 
Precipitation 136 126 0.32 135 136 -0.049 
Baseline poverty 0.65 0.67 -0.10 0.65 0.64 0.036 
Baseline agricultural effort 13 10 0.57 13 13 -0.053 
Baseline population density 2.9 6.6 -0.57 3.0 2.8 0.030 
Baseline int. migration 0.11 0.067 0.41 0.11 0.12 -0.10 
Distance to Dist. HQ 4.3 2.6 0.44 4.2 4.6 -0.093 
Distance to pop. centre 10K  4.5 2.6 0.29 4.4 5.4 -0.14 
Distance to pop. centre 50K  11 6.6 0.43 11 12 -0.069 
IUCN category§ 0.20 0.20 -0.006 0.20 0.19 0.012 
District§ 0.014 0.014 -0.022 0.014 0.014 -0.012 
§ Data are presented as the mean across all IUCN categories and Districts   
 
Supplementary Figure 7 | Covariate balance before and after full optimal matching 
using ICIMOD’s forest cover change dataset. a-b, Standardized mean difference for the 1060 
propensity score and all matching covariates before (open circles) and after matching (orange 
circles) (a). Balance results for District and IUCN category are presented as means across all 
Districts and IUCN categories. Propensity score density distribution before and after 
matching for treatment (purple) and control (yellow) groups (overlaps between propensity 
score distributions are represented in grey) (b). Matching resulted in a much-improved 1065 
overlap between propensity scores.  
 
 
Supplementary Table 7 | Covariate balance before and after optimal full matching using 
ICIMOD’s forest cover change dataset. 1070 
 Before matching After matching 
 
Means 
Treated  
(n = 2138) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1694) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Means 
Treated 
(n = 1950) 
Means 
Control  
(n = 1496) 
Stand. 
Mean 
Diff. 
Propensity score 0.79 0.26 2.4 0.77 0.77 -8.1e-4 
VDC size 3588 3526 0.010 3642 3962 -0.051 
Baseline forest cover 0.48 0.22 1.3 0.48 0.52 -0.20 
Elevation 1385 649 0.97 1415 1504 -0.12 
Slope 24 11 1.8 24 25 -0.11 
Precipitation 144 129 0.39 142 142 0.009 
Baseline poverty 0.57 0.66 -0.44 0.58 0.58 -0.010 
Baseline agricultural effort 13 11 0.49 14 14 -0.062 
Baseline population density 2.5 5.5 -1.1 2.5 2.2 0.094 
Baseline int. migration 0.16 0.082 0.55 0.15 0.14 0.085 
Distance to Dist. HQ 3.8 3.1 0.21 3.9 4.2 -0.087 
Distance to pop. centre 10K  5.3 3.1 0.39 5.5 5.8 -0.054 
Distance to pop. centre 50K  12 8.0 0.37 12 12 -0.023 
IUCN category§ 0.20 0.20 -0.13 0.20 0.20 -0.005 
District§ 0.014 0.014 -0.12 0.014 0.014 -5.3e-6 
§ Data are presented as the mean across all IUCN categories and Districts 
  
Supplementary Table 8: Spatial auto correlation results for treatment variables and 
post-matching regressions. 
 Moran's I 
Treatment Null model Propensity score model 
Presence of CF 0.23 (14)*** 0.014 (0.99) 
Area under CF 0.048 (2.0)* -0.004 (1.2) 
Duration of CF  0.039 (1.6) -0.020 (1.1) 
Post-matching model Outcome Moran's I 
Presence of CF Forest cover change [Hansen v1.0 - 2000-12] -0.015 (-0.35) 
Presence of CF Forest cover change [ICIMOD - 2000-10] -0.002 (0.32) 
Presence of CF Poverty alleviation [2001-2011] 0.007 (0.80) 
Area under CF Poverty alleviation [2001-2011] 0.026 (1.5) 
Duration of CF Forest cover change [Hansen v1.0 - 2000-12] 0.002 (0.56) 
Duration of CF Poverty alleviation [2001-2011] -0.005 (0.32) 
Values in parentheses represent standard deviate values.  1075 
§Correspond to models used to calculate propensity scores used in matching. 
***P < 0.001, *P < 0.05  
 Supplementary Figure 8 | Model residual spatial distributions and variograms of 1080 
regressions modelling presence of community forest. a-d, Model residual spatial distribution 
(a) and variogram (b) of community forest management (CFM) presence as a function of 1 
(null model). Model residual spatial distribution (c) and variogram (d) of CFM presence as a 
function of matching covariates. Each bubble corresponds to a Village Development 
Committee (VDC - our unit of analysis). Bubble size and colour (yellow, purple) correspond to 1085 
the magnitude and direction (negative, positive) of model residuals. Visual inspection of model 
residual spatial patterns and substantial reductions in semi-variance demonstrate that 
controlling for matching covariates significantly reduced spatial auto-correlation of our 
treatment. This is statistically confirmed by Moran’s I tests (Supplementary Table 9), 
suggesting that the spatial distribution of treatment assignment is close to random after 1090 
controlling for covariates. 
 
  
 Supplementary Figure 9 | Model residual spatial distributions and variograms of 1095 
regressions modelling area and duration of community forest management. a-d, Model 
residual spatial distribution (a) and variogram (b) of community forest area as a function of 
matching covariates. Model residual spatial distribution (c) and variogram (d) of community 
forest duration as a function of matching covariates. Each bubble corresponds to a Village 
Development Committee (VDC - our unit of analysis). Bubble size and colour (yellow, purple) 1100 
correspond to the magnitude and direction (negative, positive) of model residuals. Visual 
inspection of model residual spatial patterns and semi-variance suggest that, after controlling 
for matching covariates, treatment assignment is close to random. This is statistically confirmed 
by Moran’s I tests (Supplementary Table 9.  
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Supplementary Figure 10 | Spatial autocorrelation and sensitivity analyses for post-
matching regressions modelling forest cover change estimates using the global forest 
cover change v1.0 dataset. a-d, Visual inspection of the spatial distribution of post-matching 
regression residuals (a) and variogram (b) suggest negligible spatial auto-correlation. This is 
confirmed by our Moran’s I test (Moran’s I = -0.015, Standard deviate = -0.35, P = 0.72). Each 1110 
bubble corresponds to a Village Development Committee (VDC - our unit of analysis) in our 
analysis. Bubble size and colour (yellow, purple) represent magnitude and direction (negative, 
positive) of residuals. The legend presents bubble size relative to the largest and smallest 
residual. Sensitivity analysis66 of our principal model (c), and one including a treatment 
(community forest management) and baseline poverty interaction term (d). Green horizontal 1115 
lines correspond to treatment effects, and x symbols correspond to individual covariates and 
the amount of variation that they explain in our models (partial R2). Dashed vertical lines 
represent the median covariate variation explained. Visual inspections of sensitivity analyses 
results suggest that to change the estimated effect of our treatment variable to zero, non-
measured confounders would have to explain substantially more than the median variation 1120 
explained by measured covariates. 
  
 
Supplementary Figure 11 | Spatial autocorrelation and sensitivity analyses for post-
matching regressions modelling forest cover change estimates using the International 1125 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) dataset. a-d, Visual inspection 
of the spatial distribution of post-matching regression residuals (a) and variogram (b) suggest 
negligible spatial autocorrelation. This is confirmed by our Moran’s I test (Moran’s I = -0.002, 
Standard deviate = 0.32, P = 0.75). Each bubble corresponds to a Village Development 
Committee (VDC - our unit of analysis) in our analysis. Bubble size and colour (green, blue) 1130 
represent magnitude and direction (negative, positive) of residuals. The legend presents bubble 
size relative to the largest and smallest residual. Sensitivity analysis66 of our principal model 
(c), and one including a treatment (community forest management) and baseline poverty 
interaction term (d). Green horizontal lines correspond to treatment effects, and x symbols 
correspond to individual covariates and the amount of variation that they explain in our models 1135 
(partial R2). Dashed vertical lines represent the median covariate variation explained. Visual 
inspections of sensitivity analyses results suggest that to change the estimated effect of our 
treatment variable to zero, non-measured confounders would have to explain substantially more 
than the median variation explained by measured covariates. 
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Supplementary Figure 12 | Spatial autocorrelation and sensitivity analyses for post-
matching regressions modelling poverty alleviation as a function of presence of 
community forest management. a-c, Visual inspection of the spatial distribution of post-
matching regression residuals (a) and variogram (b) suggest negligible spatial auto-correlation. 1145 
This is confirmed by our Moran’s I test (Moran’s I = 0.007, Standard deviate = 0.80, P = 0.42). 
Each bubble corresponds to a Village Development Committee (VDC - our unit of analysis) in 
our analysis. Bubble size and colour (yellow, purple) represent magnitude and direction 
(negative, positive) of residuals. The legend presents bubble size relative to the largest and 
smallest residual. Sensitivity analysis66 of our principal model (c) Blue horizontal line 1150 
corresponds to the average treatment effects, and x symbols correspond to individual covariates 
and the amount of variation that they explain in our models (partial R2). Dashed vertical line 
represents the median covariate variation explained. Visual inspection of sensitivity analysis 
results suggests that to change the estimated effect of our treatment variable to zero, non-
measured confounders would have to explain substantially more than the median variation 1155 
explained by measured covariates. 
  
 
Supplementary Figure 13 | Spatial autocorrelation and sensitivity analyses for post-
matching regressions modelling poverty alleviation as a function of community forest 1160 
management area. a-c, Visual inspection of the spatial distribution of post-matching 
regression residuals (a) and variogram (b) suggest negligible spatial auto-correlation. This is 
confirmed by our Moran’s I test (Moran’s I = 0.026, Standard deviate = 1.5, P = 0.13). Each 
bubble corresponds to a Village Development Committee (VDC - our unit of analysis) in our 
analysis. Bubble size and colour (yellow, purple) represent magnitude and direction (negative, 1165 
positive) of residuals. The legend presents bubble size relative to the largest and smallest 
residual. Sensitivity analysis66 of our principal model (c) Blue horizontal line corresponds to 
average treatment effect, and x symbols correspond to individual covariates and the amount of 
variation that they explain in our models (partial R2). Dashed vertical line represents the median 
covariate variation explained. Visual inspection of sensitivity analysis results suggests that to 1170 
change the estimated effect of our treatment variable to zero, non-measured confounders would 
have to explain more than the median variation explained by measured covariates. 
  
 
Supplementary Figure 14 | Spatial autocorrelation and sensitivity analyses for post-1175 
matching regressions modelling forest cover change as a function of community forest 
management duration. a-c, Visual inspection of the spatial distribution of post-matching 
regression residuals (a) and variogram (b) suggest negligible spatial auto-correlation. This is 
confirmed by our Moran’s I test (Moran’s I = 0.002, Standard deviate = 0.56, P = 0.58). Each 
bubble corresponds to a Village Development Committee (VDC - our unit of analysis) in our 1180 
analysis. Bubble size and colour (yellow, purple) represent magnitude and direction (negative, 
positive) of residuals. The legend presents bubble size relative to the largest and smallest 
residual. Sensitivity analysis66 of our principal model (c) Green horizontal line correspond to 
average treatment effect, and x symbols correspond to individual covariates and the amount of 
variation that they explain in our models (partial R2). Dashed vertical line represents the median 1185 
covariate variation explained. Visual inspection of sensitivity analysis results suggests that to 
change the estimated effect of our treatment variable to zero, non-measured confounders would 
have to explain more than the median variation explained by measured covariates. 
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Supplementary Figure 15 | Spatial autocorrelation and sensitivity analyses for post-
matching regressions modelling poverty alleviation as a function of community forest 
management duration. a-c, Visual inspection of the spatial distribution of post-matching 
regression residuals (a) and variogram (b) suggest negligible spatial auto-correlation. This is 
confirmed by our Moran’s I test (Moran’s I = -0.005, Standard deviate = 0.32, P = 0.75). Each 1195 
bubble corresponds to a Village Development Committee (VDC - our unit of analysis) in our 
analysis. Bubble size and colour (yellow, purple) represent magnitude and direction (negative, 
positive) of residuals. The legend presents bubble size relative to the largest and smallest 
residual. Sensitivity analysis66 of our principal model (c) Blue horizontal line correspond to 
average treatment effect, and x symbols correspond to individual covariates and the amount of 1200 
variation that they explain in our models (partial R2). Dashed vertical line represents the median 
covariate variation explained. Visual inspection of sensitivity analysis results suggests that to 
change the estimated effect of our treatment variable to zero, non-measured confounders would 
have to explain more than the median variation explained by measured covariates. 
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Supplementary Figure 16 | Spatial distribution of differences in forest cover change 
estimates. a-c, Spatial distribution of differences between cover change estimates between the 
high-resolution forest cover change dataset v1.037 and the International Centre for Integrated 1210 
Mountain Development (ICIMOD) dataset69 (a). Histogram of the difference between datasets 
for all VDCs (n = 3832) included in our analysis (b). Histogram of the difference between 
datasets for VDCs (n = 2816) where the difference falls within 0.05 points from the median 
difference (-0.2) between datasets (c). This subset represents 73% of VDCs within our dataset. 
  1215 
 
Supplementary Figure 17 | Post-matching coefficients of poverty alleviation analyses 
along an increased threshold of treatment assignment. Increasing the area of Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) under community forest management (CFM) to assign 
treatment provides a sharper differentiation between treatment and control units, and increases 1220 
the treatment effects size on the outcome variable 
  
  
Supplementary Figure 18 | Comparison of District-level small-area poverty estimates for 1225 
2011 and census-derived multi-dimensional poverty index for 2011. The national census-
derived multi-dimensional poverty estimate in our analysis, which includes health, education 
and livelihood standards dimensions, is highly correlated with a household consumption-
derived poverty index generated using the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS)45. 
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Supplementary Table 9 | Regression results for forest cover change using data from 
ICIMOD and combined incidence and intensity poverty alleviation measure (M0) as a 
function of community forest management arrangements established prior to 2000. 
  No interaction Interaction 
 Before Matching After Matching 
Forest cover change [2000-10]§ T=2138, C=1694 T=1950, C=1496 
Treatment: CF [Yes] 0.25 (0.068)*** [0.073] 0.11 (0.048)* [0.042] 0.60 (0.14)*** [0.12] 
Poverty [2001] -0.71 (0.17)*** [0.17] -0.83 (0.17)*** [0.17] -037 (0.22) [0.22] 
CF [Yes] * Poverty [2001   -0.83 (0.23)*** [0.20] 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.53 0.53 
 Before Matching After Matching  
Poverty alleviation [M0] T=2138, C=1694 T=1948, C=1462  
Treatment: CF [Yes] 0.011 (0.002)*** [0.002] 0.007 (0.002)*** [0.002]  
Poverty [M0 2001] 0.59 (0.009) [0.050] 0.63 (0.01)*** [0.01]  
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.71  
Values in parentheses represent naïve standard errors; values in square brackets represent Huber-White corrected 1235 
standard errors. 
§Percentages of forest cover change were transformed using a Lambert W function. 
***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01, *P < 0.05 
 
Supplementary Table 10 | Regression results for forest cover change and poverty 1240 
reduction as a function of community forest management arrangements established after 
2000. 
  No Interaction effect Interaction effect Squared interaction 
 Before Matching After Matching 
Forest cover change [2000-2012]§ T=510, C=1184 T=466, C=1109 
CF [Yes] -1e-5 (3e-4) [3e-4] 1e-4 (2e-4) [1e-4] 0.002 (0.007)** [0.006] 0.001 (0.005)** [0.005] 
Poverty [2001] 0.002 (0.001) [0.001] 1e-4 (8e-4) [9e-4] 0.001 (0.001) [0.001] 0.001 (0.001) [0.001] 
CF [Yes] * Poverty [2001]   -0.003 (0.001)** [0.001] -0.002 (0.009)** [0.007] 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Poverty alleviation [2001-2011]     
CF [Yes] 0.024 (0.007)** [0.008] 0.014 (0.006)* [0.005]   
Poverty [2001] 0.43 (0.019)*** [0.024] 0.45 (0.023)*** [0.031]   
CF [Yes] * Poverty [2001]     
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.54   
Values in parentheses represent naïve standard errors; values in square brackets represent Huber-White corrected 
standard errors. 
§Proportions of forest cover change were transformed using a Lambert W function. 1245 
***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01 
 
Supplementary  Table 11 | Post-matching regression results for presence of CFM 
treatment thresholds on poverty. 
Area under CFM Before matching After matching 
 T = 949, C = 1649 T = 848, C = 1159 
10% 2.1 (061)***[0.63] 2.4 (0.45)*** [0.42] 
 T = 674, C = 1649 T = 615, C = 996 
15% 0.24 (0.68)*** [0.68] 2.5 (0.48)*** [0.43] 
 T = 467, C = 1649 T = 443, C = 996 
20% 2.7 (0.76)*** [0.76] 2.7 (0.49)*** [0.49] 
 T = 285, C = 1649 T = 275, C = 973 
25% 3.1 (0.86)*** [0.88] 2.8 (0.66)*** [0.54] 
  1250 
Supplementary Table 12 | Ordinal logistic regression results for joint poverty and forest 
cover change outcomes as a function of the presence of community forest management 
arrangements using third quartile values. 
Outcome Treatment  
Before Matching 
(T=2138, C=1694) 
After Matching 
(T=1960, C=1468) 
Win-win CF [Yes]  0.15 (0.10) 0.33 (0.079)*** 
Residual deviance   5964 4836 
Values in brackets represent standard errors.  
***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01 1255 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Table 13 | Regression results for a PCA-calculated joint outcome variable 1260 
as a function of community forest management arrangements established prior to 2000. 
Outcome Treatment  
Before Matching 
(T=2138, C=1694) 
After Matching 
(T=1960, C=1468) 
Win-Win [PCA1] CF [Yes]  0.17 (0.038)*** [0.40] 0.16 (0.026)*** [0.025] 
Adjusted R2   0.39 0.41 
Values in parentheses represent naïve standard errors; values in square brackets represent Huber-White corrected 
standard errors. 
***P < 0.001 
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Supplementary Figure 19 | Scatterplot and data inclusion thresholds. Data points included 
in the sensitivity analysis are based on values within 90% to 50% of the median poverty 1270 
alleviation and deforestation values. 
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Supplementary Table 14 | Ordinal logistic regression results for joint poverty and forest 
cover change outcomes as a function of the presence of community forest management 
arrangements for 80% and 70% reduced dataset. 
Outcome Treatment 
Before Matching 
(T=1465, C=976) 
After Matching 
(T=1343, C=734) 
Win-win (80% of dataset) CF [Yes] 0.26 (0.12)* 0.31 (0.095)** 
[Residual deviance]  [4504] [3826] 
  
Before Matching 
(T=1115, C=736) 
After Matching 
(T=1054, C=532) 
Win-win (70% of dataset) CF [Yes] 0.35 (0.14)* 0.20 (0.11)§ 
[Residual deviance]  [3413] [2842] 
Values in brackets represent standard errors.  
**P < 0.01, *P < 0.05, §P = 0.075 1280 
